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ABSTRACT
Since 2005, international civil society support has faced increasing resistance around
the world. Ethiopia is widely recognized as a key example of this so-called Closing
Space phenomenon. With the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP)
Ethiopia has established strict regulations on civil society organizations that, in
particular, restrict the ability of local associations to make use of foreign funding
and the range of activities allowed for foreign (funded) organizations. This paper
traces the process of international negotiations that has accompanied the drafting
of the CSP and identiﬁes the consequences of these negotiations for international
civil society support in the country. Focusing on the interaction between foreign
“donors” and the Ethiopian government, it analyzes (a) what precisely these
negotiations have been about, (b) to what extent these negotiations have actually
inﬂuenced the content of the CSP, and (c) how the CSP as ﬁnally adopted has
actually aﬀected international civil society support in Ethiopia.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 28 June 2018; Accepted 26 November 2018
KEYWORDS civil society; NGOs; NGO regulation; shrinking space; closing space; international civil society
support; democracy promotion; development cooperation; foreign funding; Ethiopia
1. Introduction
Increasing restrictions on international civil society support constitute a key element in
the much-discussed backlash against democracy promotion.1 In particular, the last 15
years have seen the proliferation of so-called NGO laws that, amongst other things,
impose constraints on the access of local civil society organizations (CSOs) to foreign
support and thereby restrict the space of both local CSOs and international democracy
promoters.2 In this context, “[e]ﬀorts to pressure governments not to adopt restrictive
NGO laws have surged as an area of diplomatic engagement”.3 While scholars have
started to analyze the overall phenomenon of a “closing space” around civil society
support, existing studies are mostly policy-oriented and/or focus on analyzing the
causes that explain its spread.4 We, therefore, lack empirical research on these diplo-
matic attempts to prevent processes of closure as well as on the negotiations they
give rise to. How do “donor” governments that engage in civil society support try to
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convince “recipient” governments to renounce or temper planned restrictions? How do
recipient governments respond? And what are the dynamics and the consequences of
such intergovernmental communication?
This paper contributes to closing this research gap by adopting a focus on democracy
promotion negotiation as outlined in the introduction to this special issue. Empirically,
it zooms in on one prominent case, the Ethiopian Charities and Societies Proclamation
(CSP). Adopted in early 2009, the CSP is usually considered as a prime example of a
particularly harsh NGO law, and Ethiopia is, hence, among the most frequently men-
tioned cases of closing space.5 At the same time, when the controversy over the CSP
erupted, Ethiopia was considered “the largest African recipient of Overseas Develop-
ment Assistance (ODA)”, with much of this assistance being “directed towards
NGOs”.6 The CSP imposed strict regulations on this kind of foreign support; most
notably, foreign CSOs and foreign-funded Ethiopian organizations are prohibited
from working on a whole range of issues, including “the advancement of human and
democratic rights.”7 In the nine months before the CSP was adopted, representatives
of North-Western “donors” – and, in particular, the ambassadors from the US, the
UK and France – met on several occasions with Ethiopian counterparts, including
Ethiopian Prime Minister (PM) Meles Zenawi, to discuss changing draft versions of
the law. US embassy reports on these meetings have been published by Wikileaks.8
Given the dearth of empirical knowledge on intergovernmental negotiations in the
policy ﬁeld at hand, and the exceptional insights that the leaked embassy cables oﬀer
into this speciﬁc case, the following analysis primarily aims at empirically tracing the
diplomatic exchange that has accompanied the drafting of the CSP and identify its con-
sequences for international civil society support in Ethiopia. After a brief overview of
the context in Ethiopia, we reconstruct the process of negotiations based on the avail-
able US embassy reports. In doing so, we (a) systematically identify the issues that were
negotiated and (b) assess the extent to which these negotiations have inﬂuenced the
content of the CSP. Our answer to this second question is, however, tentative only
because our analysis of the international negotiations does not account for the intra-
Ethiopian process of drafting the CSP. In an additional section, we analyze (c) how
international civil society support has changed following the adoption of the CSP.
In a nutshell, we argue that the negotiations between the Ethiopian government and
North-Western donor governments covered a broad range of issues ranging from
speciﬁc provisions in the planned legislation (policy formulation) up to diﬀerent
notions of democracy that underlie the diverging viewpoints on international civil
society support (normative premises). According to our analysis, the impact of these
negotiations on the content of the CSP has been quite limited, but this does not mean
that they have been unimportant. In fact, we argue, the purpose of the negotiations
was not so much to reach an agreement on the CSP (which both sides, from the
outset, considered to be an unattainable aim anyway). The shared – if implicit – aim
was rather an informal, de facto agreement that would allow for an uninterrupted con-
tinuation of bilateral relations despite the obvious and persisting diﬀerences over the
substantial issue at hand. This underlying logic of the negotiation is clearly reﬂected
in their consequences for international civil society support. While the CSP has had sig-
niﬁcant eﬀects on Ethiopian civil society organizations, its eﬀects on international civil
society support in the country have been rather limited. Donors were mostly able to
either unilaterally or in cooperation with the Ethiopian government adjust existing
civil society programmes, bringing them in line with, or exempting them from, the CSP.
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2. Ethiopia, civil society and foreign assistance: an overview
Ethiopia has a long tradition of civic organizing at the community level. However, it was
the end of the military regime of the Derg in 1991 and the political liberalization under
the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) that facilitated the
emergence of a broad range of formally established NGOs.9 Stimulated by increasing
North-Western aid, “the number of active, Ethiopia-based NGOs grew exponentially,
from 70 in 1994 to 368 in 2000, and to 2275 in 2009.”10 In the 1990s, most organizations
did not get involved in advocacy, human rights and/or electoral processes, but rather
focused on service delivery. This, however, changed with the 2005 elections, which
saw national and international NGOs play a much more active role. When opposition
parties denounced fraud and large-scale post-electoral protests challenged the oﬃcial
results, the government violently cracked down on the protests and speciﬁcally
accused civil society organizations and activists of supporting both the opposition
and the violence.11 In this context, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs also
expelled three US-based organizations – the International Foundation for Electoral
Systems (IFES), the International Republican Institute (IRI), and the National Demo-
cratic Institute (NDI) – from the country, “accusing them of operating in the
country illegally and failing to report their activities to the government.”12
The contested 2005 elections are generally regarded as the key experience that led the
Ethiopian government to take an increasingly harsh attitude and adopt a series of laws
that signiﬁcantly restricted the space for CSOs.13 These legal initiatives included the
Electoral Law of Ethiopia Amendment Proclamation (2007), the Mass Media and
Access to Information Proclamation (2008) as well as the Anti-Terrorism Proclamation
and the CSP (both 2009).
Before the CSP, the operation of CSOs in Ethiopia was not regulated by law but
merely through executive stipulations (the 1966 Association Registration Regulation,
updated through the 1995 Guidelines for NGO Operations).14 During the 1990s, Ethio-
pian CSOs themselves lobbied the government “to provide an up to date and enabling
law for their operation”.15
On January 6, 2009, the Ethiopian parliament adopted the CSP, with implemen-
tation starting one year later. The law applies to two types of nonproﬁt organizations
that either pursue charitable purposes (Charities) or the interests of their members
(Societies). These are grouped into three categories: “Ethiopian”, “Ethiopian Resident”,
and “Foreign” organizations. The ﬁrst category includes CSOs that are “wholly con-
trolled by Ethiopians” and “use not more than ten percent of their funds which is
received from foreign sources”. Once local CSOs don’t fulﬁl these criteria, they
become “Ethiopian Resident” organizations. “Foreign” organizations include non-
Ethiopian members or are controlled by foreign nationals (Article 2). This distinction
is crucial because “Ethiopian Resident” and “Foreign” organizations are prohibited
from participating in a range of activities, including the promotion of “human and
democratic rights”, “equality of nations, nationalities and peoples and that of gender
and religion”, “conﬂict resolution or reconciliation”, and “justice and law enforcement
services” (Article 14).16
All three types of organizations are required to register with the Charities and
Societies Agency (CSA), which has “virtually unlimited authority to exercise control
over the operations of a charity or society”,17 including to decline their request for regis-
tration, to revoke licenses and to oversee their activities (Articles 4–6, 84–94). Explicitly
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exempted from this proclamation are traditional, cultural or religious organizations as
well as “international or foreign organizations operating in Ethiopia by virtue of an
agreement with the Government” (Articles 3(2)), which shows that the CSP deliberately
targets a speciﬁc NGO-type of CSOs.18
3. Negotiating the Charities and Societies Proclamation: issues and
results
After a 2007 version of the CSP had been leaked in early 2008, the Ethiopian govern-
ment forwarded a ﬁrst oﬃcial draft of the CSP to representatives of local CSOs on
May 2, 2008, inviting them to a consultative meeting on May 6. This draft, which
was much more “draconian in nature” than the leaked version from 2007,19 contained
all the core regulations that would characterize the later law. During 2008, three more
draft versions were circulated (in June, September and November) until the CSP was
adopted in early January 2009.
Throughout this drafting process, Ethiopian CSOs, which had responded to the gov-
ernment’s call by establishing a joint taskforce, participated in consultative meetings
with the government, prepared joint commentaries on the drafts, and organized
forums to discuss the issue with government oﬃcials, experts and CSO representa-
tives.20 In the following, however, we will focus on the discussions between the Ethio-
pian authorities and international donors. According to Debebe Hailegebriel, a leading
consultant of the taskforce of Ethiopian CSOs, the “international community played a
signiﬁcant role in exerting inﬂuence on the Ethiopian Government.”21 In particular,
four in-depth meetings of the ambassadors from the US (Donald Yamamoto), the
UK (Norman Ling) and France (Stephane Gompertz) with Ethiopian PM Meles
Zenawi took place in May, June, July and October 2008. In addition, US representatives
met with high-level oﬃcials of the Ethiopian government and the ruling EPRDF.22
3.1. Overview of the process and the results of the negotiations
A few days after the ﬁrst 2008 draft of the CSP was released, US Ambassador Yamamoto
met with Ethiopian State Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs Tekeda Alemu and “raised this
issue in strong terms”, emphasizing that the new law would aﬀect all US foreign assist-
ance programmes in the country.23 The US Embassy also reportedly called on oﬃcials
in the Ethiopian government “to raise concerns about the draft law” and started to
“cooperate with other major donors”. This culminated in the ﬁrst meeting of the
three ambassadors with PM Meles.24 In this meeting, the ambassadors “raised deep
concern that the new proposed NGO law […] would so severely restrict NGO oper-
ations […] that it would severely undermine Ethiopia’s relations with its most impor-
tant donor partners.” Meles, in return, promised “to delay submission of the proposed
law to the council of ministers until the ambassadors could submit in writing speciﬁc
concerns and questions on the NGO law and follow-up discussion with the Prime Min-
ister.”25 The agreed-upon aim of the negotiations was, therefore, to clarify doubts con-
cerning the planned legislation, including by revising the draft law.
The US Embassy, however, did not expect that more than minor revisions were
likely to happen and, therefore, also used the negotiations to buy time and, through
coordinated donor outreach activities to raise concerns with Ethiopian government
and party oﬃcials, “seek to stop the law from progressing further.”26 In addition to
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using the negotiations to advocate “for a discrete set of technical alterations that would
make the bill less prohibitive to civil society operations in Ethiopia”,27 the North-
Western ambassadors also aimed at applying “international pressure to either ‘kill’
or delay the bill.”28 The other way round, the donors anticipated that PM Meles
would use the negotiations only as a means to legitimize, through cosmetic changes,
a basically unmodiﬁed law.29
Before the second meeting in June, the ambassadors sent a joint letter to the govern-
ment “outlining concerns” over the draft CSP. In response, PM Meles announced
during the conversation that his government would redraft the bill in order to
address “the confusion and misunderstandings over many of the provisions”.30 The
revised version, which was released in June and reportedly included a series of amend-
ments, was then again subjected to discussions with local CSOs and international
donors.
In the third meeting in July, which was again preceded by a joint letter to Meles,31
the ambassadors “passed over an analysis of the law prepared by the donors group”.
The PM “said he would review the text and make changes to the proposed law, if
necessary.”32 From the donors’ perspective, however, this third draft of the CSP
proved but “a minimally revised version.”33 This was reﬂected in the fourth
meeting, in which Meles reiterated the willingness to continue the discussion “with
foreign interlocutors”, albeit not with a view to further modify the draft law but in
order “to get Ethiopia’s position better understood.”34 The ambassadors continued
to express “their fundamental opposition to the bill”, while also proposing adjustments
“that would make the bill less prohibitive”.35 Yet, the fourth draft released in Novem-
ber 2008 did, again, “not incorporate any of the changes requested or address any of
the concerns raised by successive waves of donor ambassadors and principals from
capitals.”36
Finally, when this fourth draft was submitted to Parliament in early December, the
US ambassador presented to key members of parliament “a technical analysis of the bill
highlighting potential areas which may spur unintended consequences for foreign
assistance and which oﬀered minor changes that would make the bill less objectionable
without violating the main tenets driving the bill.”37
Comparing the diﬀerent draft versions of the CSP with the law eventually adopted by
parliament, the following revisions stand out:
. The preamble was modiﬁed, deleting explicitly restrictive references, including to the
necessity of “the registration, licensing and regulation of charities and societies […]
for the prevention of the illegal acts that are perpetrated in the name of serving it, and
for the fulﬁllment of the government’s duty to protect the public against illegal activi-
ties contrary to peace, order and morality.”38
. An intermediary category (“Ethiopian Residents”) was introduced, thereby avoiding
the label “foreign” for foreign-funded Ethiopian NGOs.
. The ten-percent threshold refers to the share of the funds actually used, not – as
initially phrased – to the percentage of their total asset.
. The activities that are reserved for “Ethiopian” NGOs have been modiﬁed. In par-
ticular, development-related purposes (promotion of “community development”
and of “the sustainable development of the nations, nationalities, and peoples of
Ethiopia”) were deleted from the list of restricted areas. In turn, however, the pro-
motion of gender equality and of the rights of disabled and children was added.
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. The objectives, powers and functions of the CSA have been phrased in less restrictive
(controlling) and more supportive (enabling) terms and made somewhat less
intrusive.
. The need to renew the license of NGOs was changed from annually to every three
years.
. Some harsh penalties, including the threat of imprisonment, were removed from the
law.
. The right to appeal to the judiciary for “Ethiopian” NGOs was broadened beyond
“questions of law” to include any “decision.”39
According to Hailegebriel, the revisions were mostly “technical and cosmetic”,
suggesting that the impact of the consultations on the CSP was rather limited.40 In
its oﬃcial response to the adoption of the CSP, the EU, however, welcomed “the
thorough exchanges of views” with the Ethiopian government and appreciated “that
some of its concerns expressed on the draft have been addressed”, even if it duly
noted that “core elements” of the law “remain unchanged” and “could potentially
restrict the operations of civil society organisations, as well as international partners
assistance.”41 The oﬃcial response from Washington was less balanced and only
expressed concerns, but in toned-down language: The US government showed itself
“concerned” that the CSP “appears to restrict civil society activities and international
partners’ ability to support Ethiopia’s own development eﬀorts.”42
What is largely absent from the negotiations is explicit threats. Very clearly, there
was little room for the US, or international donors more broadly, to threaten with sig-
niﬁcant negative consequences for the Ethiopian government as a bargaining tool. First,
given that the focus of US foreign assistance was in an area (humanitarian aid) not
touched by the CSP, only a small share of US aid was likely to be aﬀected by the new
restrictions. Second, given its key strategic interests in Ethiopia,43 the US never con-
sidered broader sanctions. Third, the Ethiopian authorities knew this: According to
an US embassy assessment, the Ethiopian government was “conﬁdent that donors
will not suspend or cut” foreign aid, “regardless of what actions the GoE [Government
of Ethiopia] takes.”44 As a result, indirect threats that the new NGO law could have
“unintended consequences” for “development and other programs”45 were, predictably,
in vain. At the same time, this interest in not threatening the existing cooperation was
mutual, as can be seen, for instance, in Ethiopian “assurances of exceptions [to the new
restrictions] for U.S. assistance programs.”46 Still, PM Meles made clear that threaten-
ing a reduction in foreign support would not lead to reconsideration on the part of the
Ethiopian government.47
In terms of the overall analytical framework of this special issue, the negotiations
touched upon four diﬀerent levels of depth: With a view to the (draft) NGO law, nego-
tiations concerned (1) the overall content and speciﬁc provisions of the CSP (policy
formulation) and (2) the ways in which this law would aﬀect (or not) the implemen-
tation of individual programmes and projects (implementation); at a more general
level, from the very beginning, the conversations also referred (3) to the political situ-
ation in Ethiopia, including what is needed in terms of improving its democracy
(problem deﬁnition), and (4) to basic concepts and norms that underpin the regu-
lation and support of civil society (normative premises). In fact, when reading the
US embassy reports on the conversations, it is remarkable how immediately and con-
sistently the parties ended up talking about very basic notions of democracy
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(promotion) and civil society (support) and how these might and should be under-
stood in the Ethiopian context.
3.2. Policy formulation
In terms of policy issues, a couple of speciﬁc topics stand out. US government oﬃcials and
the three ambassadors regularly argued against the distinction between “Ethiopian” and
“foreign”CSOs and the restrictions that were to comewith being categorized as the latter,
but quickly realized that the basic aim to restrict the areas of legitimate activity for those
organizations that are either foreign or receive signiﬁcant foreign funding was non-nego-
tiable for the Ethiopian government.48 The symbolic concession to label foreign-funded
Ethiopian CSOs “Ethiopian Residents” instead of “Foreign” was apparently not seen as
signiﬁcant.49 As a consequence, eﬀorts focused on the restricted purposes. In the July
meeting, for instance, Meles reportedly responded to the three ambassadors’ “concerns
over restrictions in helping women, children and handicap” by arguing that “these are
advocacy issues and it could not be accepted because these are distinctly Ethiopian
issues for Ethiopians to address.”50 Later, when US Assistant Secretary Kramer argued
“that certain sectors, such as conﬂict resolution and children’s rights should not be con-
sidered inherently political, Meles responded that, in his view, conﬂict resolution typi-
cally deals with issues of land, water, religion, which are inherently political.”51
Judging from the revisions actually made to the CSP, it was only development-related
purposes that the Ethiopian government accepted as not all-too political in nature.
Other policy issues raised by the donors included the powers of CSA, the reporting
requirements, the question of sanctions/penalties, and the right to judicial appeal.
Meles, in response,
said he would review and consult his advisors on the Ambassadors’ concerns over the proposed
agency […], as well as the criminalization of activities and administrative errors. He would also
review again the lack of an appeal process for those CSOs/NGOs objecting to administrative
decisions of the agency.52
Later, he emphasized that the Ethiopian government had indeed addressed some of
these concerns by “permitting court appeals [for ‘Ethiopian’ CSOs] on matters of
both law and fact” and by eliminating “annual reporting requirements.”53 In the end,
as mentioned above, the power of the CSA was also gradually relaxed and penalties sof-
tened. In a conversation with US Assistant Secretary Kramer, Meles, however, explicitly
rejected a right to judicial appeal for foreign organizations “by arguing that such organ-
izations would only be operating in country by invitation from the GoE”. The US
embassy accepted this argument as “pertinent for foreign-funded NGOs focused on pol-
itical activities through an agreement with the GoE”, but noted that “it ignores the
denial of judicial appeal to the far broader grouping of foreign-funded NGOs
engaged in non-prohibited development activities.”54
Finally, theUSEmbassy and the groupof ambassadors aimed at shielding or exempting
their ownassistance programmes.USAssistant SecretaryKramer, for instance, “suggested
creating possible carve-outs” for US-, EU-, and UN-funded projects. Meles, however,
pointed to already existing “carve-outs.”55 Indeed, already the ﬁrst 2008 draft stated
that the CSP would not be applicable to “international or foreign organizations operating
in Ethiopia by virtue of an agreement with the [Ethiopian government]”.56 This problem
was, therefore, rather treated as an issue that concerned the implementation of the CSP.
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3.3. Implementation
A major concern that permeates the US embassy cables is the donors’ worries that their
own foreign assistance programmes might be signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the new CSO law.
In mid-June, the US Embassy reported that the “now inevitable” CSP “will likely force
the termination of all U.S. and other donors’ foreign assistance for democracy and gov-
ernance, human rights, conﬂict resolution, and our important advocacy programs, par-
ticularly on behalf of women’s rights.”57 The Ethiopian response to these concerns
basically consisted in “assurances of exceptions [to the new restrictions] for U.S. assist-
ance programs.”58 More generally, PM Meles emphasized that “continued involvement
of foreign NGOs in political reform and advocacy” was acceptable if and when “there is
a contract between the foreign NGO and a government entity for a speciﬁc time
period.”59 For the US government, however, the problem persisted that, even if US pro-
grammes would be exempted from the restrictions, the CSP would still “prohibit signiﬁ-
cant support to Ethiopian CSOs to assist with the implementation of such programs.”60
The issue of reporting requirements of local CSOs was also discussed with a view to
their future implementation. When Assistant Secretary Kramer noted
that the new Civil Society Agency’s reporting requirements would be onerous on NGOs, Meles
assured that copies of existing NGO reports provided to their funding agencies would suﬃce to
meet the stipulated reporting requirement and that the CSA would strive to minimize additional
reporting requirements.61
Generally, the Ethiopian government continuously argued that “the overwhelming
part of foreign and local NGO activity in Ethiopia” would not be aﬀected by the law
and that implementation would be narrowly focused on “the area of internal politics.”62
PM Meles suggested that, in order to “overcome the bitter and ‘poisonous’ discussion”
on the draft law, it would be better to quickly adopt the CSP and “then work coopera-
tively with the CSO/NGO groups and donor community to make the new legislation
work.”63 In fact, once the proclamation was approved by parliament, the donors
started to focus on implementation. The three ambassadors “underscored Ethiopia’s
sovereign right to oversee and regulate all foreign activities but added that, depending
on how the law is implemented, NGOs may ﬁnd it impossible to operate in some areas,
such as democracy and governance”. They, therefore, emphasized “that there needs to
be close coordination and dialogue to ensure that the implementation of the law will not
be harsh or so restrictive as to force some NGOs to close operations.”64 Likewise, the
EU, in its oﬃcial response to the adoption of the CSP, expressed the hope “that the
law will be implemented in an open-minded and constructive spirit”.65 The US
Embassy, on its part, reported to Washington that the US, on behalf of the group of
international donors, would “lead eﬀorts to monitor the implementation of the CSO
law in an eﬀort to moderate potential excesses and prevent harsh implementation.”66
3.4. Problem deﬁnition
The negotiations also revealed fundamentally diﬀerent perceptions of the main political
challenges facing Ethiopia. According to the Ethiopian government, the CSP basically
addresses two key problems with democracy and civil society (support) in Ethiopia.
The ﬁrst one concerns a lack of regulation of CSOs. This has, ﬁrst and foremost,
negative implications for national security: As PM Meles explained to the ambassadors,
the law was needed “to ensure CSOs and NGOs are truly focused on helping the
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development of the country and not involved in illegal activities or sponsorship of extre-
mist groups.”67 In general, “anti-democratic sectors of society” are depicted as a crucial
challenge to democracy and stability; this explicitly includes “opposition leaders”, which
are seen as associated with the former Derg regime, opposed to the (democratic) con-
stitution of the country and unwilling to engage in a genuine dialogue and refrain from
violence.68 EPRDF’s central committee member Bereket Simon explicitly argued “that
NGOs are working closely with terrorists and undermining Ethiopia’s constitution.”69
In a conversion with US Assistant Secretary of State Kramer,
Meles claimed that the intent was to divide NGOs between those engaged in political activities
and those not. For those not engaged in political activities, Meles argued the purpose of the law
was to provide transparency about funding and accountability about expenditures.70
In another discussion with Kramer, Meles referred to the “‘lack of accountability’
between civil society organizations and their constituents” that would be addressed
by the new law: “Since foreign funding is ‘not earned,’ he argued, it produces money
streams independent of its membership, automatically ‘inverting an organization’s
accountability away from its constituents’ and creating ‘networks of rent-seeking’
NGOs and NGO heads.”71
The second problem, from the Ethiopian government’s perspective, concerned a lack
of commitment or ownership of democratic norms in Ethiopian society: “to become a
strong and vibrant democratic state that advocates for human/civil rights, it must have
the political will and commitment to make sacriﬁces and to advance these issues.”72 The
challenge ahead, therefore, was rather about “building lasting democratic institutions
such as the policy, army, and judiciary”73 than about empowering groups that might
well threaten democracy and security.
The donor perspective was quite diﬀerent. The three ambassadors emphasized “the
importance to allow NGOs to operate freely and unrestricted in Ethiopia because of the
work they provide for the development of Ethiopia.”74 The US government continu-
ously referred to the “backsliding on democracy and human rights” that Ethiopia
had experienced since 2005.75 This observation of a shrinking political space was expli-
citly rejected as factually wrong by the Ethiopian government.76 However, it is interest-
ing to note that the US embassy took the concerns raised by the Ethiopian government
as genuine: For the embassy, the meetings “were crucial in eliciting the fundamental
belief among ruling party hard-liners such as Bereket, that CSOs are undermining
Ethiopia by supporting terrorists.”77 But the US did explicitly disapprove “the notion
that foreign support to civil society groups addressing democratic rights issues poses
a threat to democratization” and also “rejected Meles’s assertion that foreign funding
to enable domestic advocacy is undemocratic.”78 This already points to the normative
controversy that underlay the negotiations.
3.5. Normative premises
With a view to the normative premises at stake in the debate about civil society regu-
lation/support,79 the Ethiopian government basically referred to sovereignty and own-
ership as key norms underpinning the CSP. PM Meles emphasized “the right of the
nation to restrict foreign entities from participating in the domestic politics of Ethio-
pia”. He added that such restrictions are also needed with a view to the (shared) nor-
mative aim to promote democracy in Ethiopia: “To be sustainable, Ethiopia must
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achieve democratic standards on its own.” Democratic institutions and values, there-
fore, “must be born and developed by Ethiopians themselves” and “cannot, and must
not, be imposed by outsiders or through money distributed to advance these issues”.
“Without ‘ownership’”, Meles argued, “Ethiopia will not have a strong and sustainable
democratic tradition.”80 Exceptions to this basic norm of non-interference can only be
granted by the Ethiopian government and should be temporary only81 Pointing to “a
diﬀerence of opinion on the role of civil society”, Meles argued that, while “non-citizens
may have the privilege of being involved on such [political] issues, they do not have a
right to be involved.”82
In their responses, the donor representatives did not explicitly reject these normative
arguments but tried to qualify them. According to a US embassy report, “the inter-
national community recognizes the need for enhanced regulation and oversight to regu-
larize registration and establish procedures”, but emphasizes the “high anxiety that the
new law will so restrict NGOs that their operations would be forced to close.”83 With a
view to the issue of ownership, the French Ambassador “argued that Ethiopia is on the
democratic path so it is Ethiopian in nature. Providing assistance will help the process
move faster, why deny groups assistance and retard such development?” Meles
responded that “the plague of money also allows many groups to focus their work on
deﬁnitions established by the donors in order to secure funding”. To make sure
foreign assistance and foreign CSOs help democracy, support had to come “at the
request of the government not imposed from the outside.”84 Another counter argument
made by donors is exempliﬁed by Assistant Secretary Kramer’s suggestion “that Meles
view donor-funded projects as transitional, designed to last only until such organiz-
ations are domestically independent and accountable.”85 Likewise, in a public discus-
sion on Ethiopia in Washington, Kramer acknowledged that “indigenous movements
[should] lead the way” but argued that, given the lack of domestic funding, foreign
donors are needed “for an interim period” in order to “give people the opportunity
to establish roots and a ﬁrm foundation so that over time they don’t need to be
relying or dependent on foreign funding.”86
In the course of this normative controversy, diverging notions of democracy and
democratization were frequently articulated.87 Indeed, in the midst of the CSP nego-
tiations, PM Meles suggested to establish “an on-going senior bilateral dialogue on
democracy and human rights issues”, a proposal that was supported by the US
Embassy.88 On the part of Ethiopian government, one core argument was that
shared values, and a common belief in “universal democratic principles”, would still
take particular shapes in individual countries and would, therefore, develop in a
speciﬁc way also in Ethiopia, “in accordance with its own culture.”89 The US
embassy, in its reporting to Washington, recognized the speciﬁc “guiding philosophy”
that characterizes the Ethiopian leadership, namely a notion of “Revolutionary Democ-
racy” understood “as a top-down obligation of convincing rural Ethiopians of what is in
their best developmental and governance interest and providing the structures to
implement that until the people can do it for themselves.”90 In a conversation with
US Ambassador Yamamoto in July 2009, PM Meles argued speciﬁcally that provisions
in those laws, including the CSP, “which western and donor countries perceive as
restrictive”, were indeed “counter to, and in conﬂict with, the ‘old paradigm’ of democ-
racy”, but not necessarily “‘in conﬂict with democracy in Ethiopia’”. The PM went on to
suggest that the two governments, rather than trying to resolve speciﬁc “policy issues”,
should address the “fundamental” diﬀerences between these “rival paradigms”, with a
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view to furthering mutual understanding: “‘While you may not agree with us,’ he
stressed, ‘you will understand where we are coming from, and vice versa.’” In response,
the US ambassador
noted that it will be important for the U.S. leaders to hear the philosophy behind Ethiopia’s
pursuit of these laws and whether they build or detract from strong institutions. He noted
that if these laws, when taken together, close political space, it will be an issue.
The US embassy concluded that “Meles ﬁnally acknowledged verbally Ethiopia’s funda-
mental difference with western approaches to democracy and development”: The “pre-
vailing ideology” within the Ethiopian ruling party, “Revolutionary Democracy”, the
embassy recognizes, “is fundamentally different from any sense of ‘democracy’ as com-
monly understood in the United States or western countries”; it is basically “a top-down
approach through which political, economic, and even social activity must be either
directed or condoned by the government (and ruling party).”91
4. Implementing the Charities and Societies Proclamation: the
consequences for civil society (support)
As a result of the negotiations, the CSP was approved in a slightly modiﬁed version. The
law remained very restrictive but, at least, opened up certain possibilities for local NGOs
and international donors to adapt, most notably by allowing for development-related
activities which, in previous draft versions, had been on the list of restricted purposes.
4.1. Consequences for local civil society
According to a study by Kendra Dupuy and colleagues, “Ethiopia’s NGO sector
changed dramatically following the 2010 implementation of the Charities and Societies
Proclamation.”92 These eﬀects are mainly due to two factors: the dependence of almost
all local NGOs on foreign funding;93 and the fact that, prior to 2009, a broad range of
organizations conducted projects in the broad area of democracy, governance and
human rights that the CSP prohibits for foreign-funded organizations.94 A comparison
of the situation before (2009) and after (2011) the implementation of the CSP shows
that 574 out of 2,275 local NGOs failed to re-register, while those that succeeded over-
whelmingly (1,330 out of 1,701) did so by registering as “Ethiopian resident” organiz-
ations.95 In order to continue receiving foreign funding, many NGOs had to adjust or
rebrand their activities, focusing on development-related issues or service delivery.96
While some human rights and civic advocacy groups rebranded and abandoned
their rights-oriented work, others closed down their organization. According to one
estimate, “only 12 or 13 of the 125 previously existing local rights groups” survived
the implementation of the CSP.97 Two prominent examples include the Ethiopian
Human Rights Council (EHRCO), an organization that monitors and documents
human rights violations, and the Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association (EWLA), a
renowned association advocating for women’s rights. Re-registration, however, was
far from easy, and the loss of foreign funding has meant that the two organizations
were forced to cut 70–85 percent of their staﬀ and scale down their activities
accordingly.98
Overall, the ﬁnancial viability and the organizational capacities of Ethiopian CSOs
“have been reduced signiﬁcantly over the last ﬁve years or so.”99 Still, the consequences
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of the CSP have been selective. In fact, between 2008 and 2014, while CSOs working on
rights issues “suﬀered setbacks and decline”, those organizations “engaged in develop-
ment activities and service delivery (e.g. Ethiopian Resident Charities and international
organisations) experienced growth.”100 Furthermore, the CSP “has had little noticeable
eﬀect” on the broad range of CSOs outside the sector of national-level NGOs, that is,
“for most community based organizations operating at the local level, for organizations
registered and working in one region, and for membership-based organizations.”101
4.2. Consequences for international civil society support
International donors likewise had to adjust to the new regulatory framework, but –
compared to Ethiopian CSOs – have been less aﬀected by the CSP. International
NGOs have been mostly successful in re-registering with the CSA, and their number
in Ethiopia has dropped only marginally from 266 (2009) to 202 (2011); still, they
had to rebrand and cut support to local NGOs that continued to work in the restricted
areas.102 Overall data on foreign aid to Ethiopia shows that “[f]unding to CSOs
remained fairly static over the period 2008 to 2011 and then increased substantially
in 2011/12.”103 According to a rough estimate, about three quarters of this foreign
civil society aid are channelled through a small set of international NGOs and, more
speciﬁcally, through humanitarian “emergency” funds, while a much smaller percen-
tage goes to Ethiopian (“resident”) NGOs. The majority of donor agencies reported
“that the Proclamation has not aﬀected their funding mechanism either in the choice
of sector or the category of CSO funded”. A relevant change, however, concerns the
reduction in the number of local CSOs that are funded directly (from 43 in 2009 to
20 in 2013) and an increasing reliance on “umbrella or network organisations, which
pass on grants to their partners or members”. Furthermore, civil society support is
increasingly channelled through three major civil society funds: the World Bank-
managed multi-donor initiative Ethiopian Social Accountability Program (ESAP2),
the European Commission-funded Civil Society Fund (CSF2), and the multi-donor
Civil Society Support Program (CSSP).104
What is important for the issue at stake is that donors and the Ethiopian government
made “a special arrangement” for two of these international civil society funds (ESAP2
and CSF2), which were oﬃcially categorized as domestic so that they can also support
Ethiopian NGOs working in the restricted areas.105 This arrangement shows that
donors have been able to negotiate some limited space for governance- and rights-
oriented civil society support. CSF2, for example, has funded civil society activities in
areas like “access to justice”, “human and women’s rights”, “conﬂict transformation”
and “consolidation of democracy”, while ESAP 2 “enabled certain CSOs, including
rights advocacy organisations to access external funds.”106 Yet, the arrangement also
grants a veto position to the Ethiopian government which is directly involved in the
steering committees.107 According to then head of the EU Delegation in Ethiopia,
Xavier Marchal, it has been “possible to do a lot of things” precisely because of the
decision “to work keeping government authorities in the picture”.108
The third international civil society fund (CSSP) has not been exempted from CSP
restrictions. Hence, it is focused on “Ethiopian resident” organizations.109 According to
a mid-term review of the programme it has, however, been important in assisting CSOs
to manage their ﬁnances in line with the stipulations introduced by the CSP. A key focus
of the programme has been on improving the relations between CSOs and the
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government at various levels, including with the CSA.110 In direct response to the CSP,
the Donor Assistance Group (DAG) in Ethiopia also established an Adaptation Facility
(AF1 and AF2) that assisted CSOs in coping with the changing legal environment.111
A few organizations and programmes unsuccessfully tried to secure an exemption
from the CSP and left Ethiopia in response. The Heinrich Böll Stiftung, for instance,
closed its oﬃce in Addis Ababa after the German government’s attempt to negotiate
a special status for Germany’s political foundations had failed.112 Also, the USAID-
funded Peace in East and Central Africa II Program, which supported local organiz-
ations in the area of peacebuilding in Kenya’s border areas with Somalia, Ethiopia,
Sudan and Uganda, cancelled its activities in Ethiopia after “a number of attempts
[…] to secure an exemption for cross border peace building” had failed.113
Another strategy of international donors has been to work with registered Ethiopian
NGOs that managed to secure exemptions from the CSP. It is unclear which and how
organizations got this status, but examples of exempted organizations include Justice for
All-Prison Fellowships of Ethiopia as well as the Peace and Development Center.
USAID, for instance, cooperates with these two NGOs in the area of democracy and
governance.114 Still, in response to a lack of policy space, USAID generally decided
to dramatically reduce its activities in the area of democracy and governance and,
instead, “include governance as a cross cutting issue through improved public sector
accountability, conﬂict sensitivity and support to civil society.”115 In contrast, civil
society support by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) has increased sig-
niﬁcantly, to 1,4 million USD in 2016 (NED 2017). In addition to NED core grantees
from the US (Solidarity Center and the Center for International Private Enterprise),
NED recently supported the above-mentioned Peace and Development Center in the
area of “human and democratic rights education” as well as a series of nongovernmental
partners that are not speciﬁed.116
5. Conclusion
Partial and partisan as they necessarily are, the US embassy cables document a
process of intergovernmental negotiations that simultaneously deal with quite
diﬀerent issues. First, there is the explicit and concrete discussion on the planned
NGO law. Referring to the provisions in the planned legislation (policy formulation)
and to what these might mean in actual practice (implementation), the donor govern-
ments raise general concerns and propose speciﬁc changes, while the Ethiopian side
responds with justiﬁcations, reassurances and concessions. This discussion is, second,
embedded in a more general debate on the appropriate role and regulation of NGOs
in Ethiopia (problem deﬁnition) as well as on the norms and basic values that under-
pin the domestic regulation or the international support of civil society organizations
(normative premises). The latter type of discussion also touches upon fundamental
disagreements that concern diﬀerent notions of democracy underlying the diverging
viewpoints.
With a view to the purpose of the negotiations, the parties did not aim at negotiating
an NGO law that could be agreed upon by both sides (from the outset, this was clearly
not a viable aim to begin with). The real aim was rather an informal, de facto agreement
that would allow for an uninterrupted continuation of bilateral relations, including in
the area of governance and democracy support, despite the obvious and persisting
diﬀerences over the substantial issue at hand. This emerges very clearly as the shared
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aim of both sides. In this sense, then, what we observe is a process of high-level com-
munication in which the relationship between the Ethiopian government and the
“donor community” in general and the US in particular is negotiated. As a result, the
continuation of a practice of ongoing negotiations (“dialogue”) becomes the aim, and
the benchmark of success, of these same negotiations. At the diﬀerent levels (of
depth) of the negotiations, this is the overall rationale that helps understand what
motivates the parties: At the concrete, policy-oriented level, “donors” wanted to
secure as much of the past practice of “cooperation” that it was used to, while the Ethio-
pian side was willing to make some minor concessions in order to guarantee basic con-
tinuity in bilateral relations; at the level of norms and values, dialogue mainly served to
mutually aﬃrm and recognize that there are diverging viewpoints but that the relation-
ship is strong enough to withstand such diﬀerences and even enables such a frank
controversy.
As a result, the Ethiopian government was able to adopt the CSP as originally envi-
saged, with only minor revisions. This certainly reﬂects the weak bargaining position of
external actors that were not willing to risk cooperative relations with an important
regional ally. But it also corresponds to the – quite remarkable – argumentative strength
of the Ethiopian government vis-à-vis the “donor community”. At the discursive level,
the normative position of the Ethiopian authorities that consistently emphasized own-
ership and the need to construct its own version of democracy was mostly accepted by
the donor governments. The latter rather made the empirical argument that the Ethio-
pian government’s strategy was, in fact, aimed at repressing dissent. This claim, valid as
it may be, was easily rejected by the Ethiopian side, which could simply present an
empirical counternarrative (highlighting the risks to societal peace and political stability
as posed by opposition-aligned CSOs). This ﬁnding suggests an interesting version of
the general tendency of negotiations to level the playing ﬁeld:117 Given the normative
structure of intergovernmental relations, which both sides present as a horizontal part-
nership, the party that aims at interfering in the internal aﬀairs of the other tends to be
on the defensive.
The underlying logic of the negotiations – as an exercise in relationship management
– is clearly reﬂected in the consequences they have had for international civil society
support in the country. While the CSP has had signiﬁcant eﬀects on local civil
society organizations, its eﬀects on international civil society support have been
rather limited. By and large, donors either unilaterally or in cooperation with the Ethio-
pian government adjusted existing civil society programs, bringing them in line with, or
exempting them from, the new regulatory framework. The actors that have obviously
suﬀered from these political dynamics at the level of intergovernmental relations are
the human rights groups and activists in Ethiopia.
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